The threat of a blackout in the capital: what is Kyiv’s ‘energy ring’ and what power cut scenarios await city residents this winter?

Hopes for a mild winter or the inaccuracy of enemy attacks can no longer form the basis for optimistic forecasts regarding the heating season in the capital. Russian forces continue to exert systematic pressure on the energy infrastructure of Kyiv and the surrounding region. The main aim of these strikes is to completely destroy local combined heat and power plants and sever the so-called ‘Kyiv energy ring’ in order to isolate the city from Ukraine’s integrated power grid. This is reported by Ekonomichna Pravda.

The current’s transport arteries: how the energy loop works

In technical terms, the Kyiv power ring is a complex network of high-voltage power lines and substations operating at 330 kilovolts (kV). It connects the capital to the national power grid and enables the city to be supplied with electricity from various geographical directions.

The backbone of this system is the 750 kV ‘Kyivska’ substation. It acts as a key gateway through which electricity generated by nuclear power stations — in particular the Rivne and Khmelnytskyi nuclear power stations — is supplied to the metropolitan area.

If we imagine the power system as a transport network, the power lines are like motorways, whilst the substations are like junctions that step down the voltage and distribute the current to end users. Thanks to the ring configuration, should one section be damaged, Ukrenergo’s dispatchers can quickly reroute the power flows via alternative routes.

Loss of a combined heat and power plant and a shortage of transmission capacity

What makes Kyiv unique is that it is the country’s largest consumer of electricity. Under normal conditions, the city requires around 1–1.2 GW (12–15 per cent of the national total), whilst during winter cold spells, demand rises to 1.8–2 GW.

Previously, a significant proportion of this consumption was met by domestic generation — Kyiv CHPP-5, CHPP-6 and Darnytsia CHPP (CHPP-4), which together were capable of generating up to 1.3 GW. However, following a series of massive attacks, including a second strike on the night of 14 October, these stations sustained severe damage and were no longer able to generate electricity in the required quantities.

The capital is now almost entirely dependent on electricity imports from other regions via the energy ring. However, the enemy has focused its attacks specifically on its key substations. To create a critical shortage, the Russians do not need to destroy absolutely all the power lines — it is enough to put a few key transformer stations out of action. This creates a paradoxical situation: the country has power generation capacity, but the grid is physically unable to transmit the necessary amount of power to Kyiv.

Three scenarios for Kyiv residents: from moderate restrictions to 20 hours without electricity

The duration of the forced power cuts this winter will depend directly on the intensity of any new shelling, the speed at which repair crews work, and the temperature conditions:

• Optimistic scenario (8–10 hours without power per day): this is possible provided the winter is moderately mild, there is no further critical damage, and damaged equipment is successfully repaired.
• Pessimistic scenario (12–16 hours without power per day): this will come to pass in the event of systematic targeted attacks on substations and delays in replacing complex equipment (such as high-power transformers).
• A worst-case scenario (up to 20 hours without power per day): would result in a combination of severe frosts and large-scale ballistic attacks on key nodes of the power grid.

At the same time, energy experts point out that a total and irreversible blackout in the capital remains unlikely thanks to the flexibility of the system and the well-established emergency response procedures.

Critical infrastructure protection and distributed generation

To maintain the city’s essential services — the operation of water supply pumping stations, heating plants, hospitals, telecommunications and electric transport — Kyiv requires approximately 200 MW of guaranteed capacity.

At present, around 150 MW of distributed generation capacity (including combined heat and power plants and high-capacity diesel generators) has already been commissioned in the capital. By the end of the year, this figure is set to rise to 180–185 MW, with a further 55–60 MW expected from the private sector.

Ultimately, Kyiv’s resilience this winter will be determined by three factors: the density of its air defence network (particularly the availability of missiles for the Patriot systems to provide protection against ballistic missiles), the availability of emergency equipment reserves, and the pace of deployment of local small-scale power generation.

As a reminder, the mayor of the capital, Vitali Klitschko, addressed the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine at the request of the members of parliament.

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